Target setting and allocative inefficiency in lending: Evidence from Two Chinese Banks

主 讲：汪勇祥　　美国南加州大学商学院副教授

主 持：聂辉华　　人大国发院常务副院长、经济学院教授

时 间：2018年6月6日（周三）下午3：00-4：30

地 点：中国人民大学明德主楼734会议室

主讲人简介：

汪勇祥博士2010年毕业于美国哥伦比亚大学商学院金融系，本科硕士分别就读于中国人民大学商学院和财金学院，现为南加州大学Marshall商学院金融学副教授（终身教职），目前研究方向集中于实证公司金融、政治经济学、组织经济学、行为经济学、中国经济等。汪教授的文章发表在顶尖经济学、金融学、会计学和管理学期刊，包括Journal of Political Economy, Review of Economic Studies, American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, Journal of Financial Economics, Review of Financial Studies, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Management Science, Administrative Science Quarterly, Strategic Management Journal 等杂志。他的研究被Wall Street Journal，Business Week, The Economist, New York Times, Science等媒体报道。

Abstract：

We study the consequences of month-end lending incentives for Chinese bank managers. Using data from two banks, one state-owned and the other partially privatized, we show a clear month-end increase in lending in the final days of each month, a result of both more loan issuance and higher value per loan. We estimate that end-of-month lending is 140 percent higher in the last 5 days of each month as a result of loan targets, with only a small amount attributable to shifting the timing of loans from the following month. End-of-month loans are 2.1 percentage points (more than 10 percent) more likely to be classified as bad in the years following issuance; a back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that the incremental loans made in order to hit targets are 15 percent more likely to eventually turn bad. Our work highlights the distortionary effects of target-setting on capital allocation, in a context in which such concerns have risen to particular prominence in recent years.

中国人民大学国家发展与战略研究院教师与博士后事务部

中国人民大学经济学院企业与组织研究中心