Influence Activities and Bureaucratic Performance:
Experimental Evidence from China
主 讲:张琼(中国人民大学公共管理学院)
主 持:刘瑞明(中国人民大学国家发展与战略研究院)
时 间:2019年6月5日(周三)14:00-15:30
地 点:中国人民大学崇德西楼(原科研楼A座)815会议室
摘 要:
Subjective performance evaluation is widely used by firms and governments to provide work incentives. However, delegating evaluation power to senior leadership could cause influence activities: agents might devote much efforts to please their supervisors, rather than focusing on productive tasks that benefit their organizations. We conduct a large-scale randomized field experiment among Chinese grassroots state employees and provide the first rigorous empirical evidence on the existence and implications of influence activities. We find that state employees are able to impose evaluator-specific influence to affect evaluation outcomes, and this process could be partly observed by their co-workers. Furthermore, introducing uncertainty in the identity of the evaluator, which discourages evaluator-specific influence activities, can significantly improve the work performance of state employees.
主讲人简介:
张琼,中国人民大学公共管理学院副教授,硕士生导师。2005年获北京大学经济学学士学位,2011年获清华大学经济学博士学位;2011-2016年任教于中央财经大学经济学院,2016年至今任教于中国人民大学公共管理学院社会保障研究所。主要研究兴趣为人口、劳动与公共政策评估。主要学术成果发表于《经济研究》、《世界经济》、《金融研究》等中文期刊及Population Studies、China Economic Review、Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy等英文期刊。
中国人民大学国家发展与战略研究院
教师与博士后事务部