主 题：The Politics of Firm-level Environmental Regulatory Actions in China: Does Fixed Asset Intensity Affect Punitive Actions and Firm Environmental Ratings?（中国企业环境监管的政治学：固定资产强度会影响惩罚行为或环保排名吗?）

摘 要：How do local governments in China enforce environmental regulations at the firm level? This paper explores this question by focusing on the role of fixed asset intensity. Our analysis of key monitored polluting firms in the Jiangsu province from 2012 and 2014 shows that a high level of fixed asset intensity increases a firm’s environmental rating by the government, but at the same time also increases its chances of receiving a government punitive action (e.g., fines, suspension, and rectification). It seems that local governments in Jiangsu target firms with higher fixed asset intensity (therefore less mobile) with punitive actions to address pollution issues. However, they also compensate these firms with better environmental ratings (which carry benefits of better access to loans, among other things), because such firms enjoy market power thanks to high market entry barriers created by high fixed asset intensities.

主 讲：李晓隽　　加拿大不列颠哥伦比亚大学政治学系

主 持：聂辉华　　中国人民大学国发院常务副院长、科研处副处长

时 间：2018年10月17日（周三）15:00-16:30

地 点：公共教学二楼2310

主讲人简介：

李晓隽，斯坦福大学政治学博士，普林斯顿-哈佛大学“中国与世界”项目博士后，现为加拿大不列颠哥伦比亚大学（UBC）政治学系助理教授、亚洲研究院研究员。他主要的研究方向是国际和比较政治经济学，在《亚洲研究》(Asian Survey)，《加拿大政治学季刊》(Canadian Journal of Political Science)，《中国国际政治》(Chinese Journal of International Politics)，《外交政策分析》(Foreign Policy Analysis)，《国际关系季刊》(International Studies Quarterly)，《当代中国》(Journal of Contemporary China)等SSCI期刊上发表论文十多篇。